University of New Mexico

UNM Digital Repository
English Language and Literature Faculty
Publications

Scholarly Communication - Departments

1990

The Constitution of Data in Linguistic Theory: Writing
Hector A. Torres
University of New Mexico

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/engl_fsp
Part of the English Language and Literature Commons

Recommended Citation
Torres, Hector A.. "The Constitution of Data in Linguistic Theory: Writing." (1990).
https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/engl_fsp/1

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Scholarly Communication - Departments at UNM
Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in English Language and Literature Faculty Publications by an
authorized administrator of UNM Digital Repository. For more information, please contact amywinter@unm.edu,
lsloane@salud.unm.edu, sarahrk@unm.edu.

I
Hector A. Torres
Hector A. Torres
Associate Professor
Department of English
University of New Mexico
Albuquerque, New Mexico 87131
MLA2003
San Diego, California

The Constitution of Data in Linguistic Theory: Writing

As a form oflanguage, writing bears a troubled relation to linguistic theory. For
reasons both historical and theoretical, contemporary linguistic theory has been reluctant
to treat the phenomenon of writing as an object of study on par with spoken language.
This essay explores this troubled relation between linguistic theory and written language
through the grid of deconstruction or post-structuralism. Though short, this essay will
require much wandering and wondering in pursuit not so much a hypothesis but a
clarification of the question: what does it mean to say that writing is not just a simple
secondary object of study of linguistics but the condition of possibility for the ideal
objects of linguistic theory. Among the wanderings I hope first to clarify the empirical
import of the question, provide some motivation for the deconstructive grid, and cross
some disciplinary boundaries between linguistics and philosophy in order to clarify what
I mean when I say that writing constitutes the data of linguistic theory not just simply
records it.
Had writing as a form of physical activity working within determined cultural
graphic systems of representation not been invented, would linguistic theory, or more
generally, the Western epistemological tradition exist? I lead with this question to
suggest that in the possible world in which the physical activity of writing and its
corollary graphic systems have not been invented, scientific inquiry would not cease but
move into or invent an oral tradition capable of safeguarding all apodictic knowledge of its
objects of inquiry. Without the activity that coordinates the eye with a surface through
the mediation of a stylus, linguistic theory would proceed along a radically different
assembly of those empirical and ideal objects. Herein, I mean that the being of those

objects, their presentation as data that linguistic theory in this possible world seeks to
explain would, would never traverse the question of re-presentation in writing. Such a
possible world would still resemble our own emprical world in its scientific projects since
both worlds would still be replete with language performances performed on a
phonocentric stage. The difference of course is that in such a possible world linguistic
theory would have no choice but to constitute its data upon this phonocentric stage as a
logical and empirical necessity. It is as if to emulate this possible world that linguistic
theory today founds itself, taking the instantiation of language in the phonic stream as
what is most worthy of study. European and American structural linguistics in particular
breaks with traditional and philological approaches to the study of particular languages,
principally lndo-European though not exclusively. The break is deemed necessary for the
constitution of a proper object of study for modern linguistic theory, Saussure's opening
concern in the Cours. However, this historical break is fraught with both theoretical and
empirical difficulties that more than a few linguists today are calling our attention to.
Geoffrey Sampson (1985) is among the linguists today who are working to close
the gap in representation that writing has experienced in the constitution of data in
linguistic theory. With great conviction, he states: "But writing is, at any rate, much more
than an inessential frill on the margin of linguistic behaviour. It therefore seems high time
for the discipline of linguistics to recognize that written language falls square! y within its
domain" (Writing Systems, 15). The good intention notwithstanding, Sampson's call to
restore writing to a position of dignity in the realm of linguistic theory fails to disentangle
itself from certain 'metaphysical presuppositions' with respect to writing as a linguistic
phenomenon. In other words, if Sampson admits written language into the definition of
linguistic theory's object of study, it is not because he wants to reverse the ontological
priority that linguistic theory assigns to speech over writing. "Spoken language is primary
both phylogenetically and ontogenetically: that is, there were spoken languages long
before there were written languages ... and each individual child brought up in a literate
community learns to speak and to understand spoken language before learning to read and
write"(13). To the extent that Sampson leaves this relation of priority intact, he repeats a
metaphysical presupposition that extends as far back as Plato and Aristotle. Plato's
condemnation of writing is well-known in the realm of philosophy and not least because
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of the performative contradiction the condemnation involves him in. Aristotle's view that
the written sign are symbols of spoken language and the latter of "the affections of the
soul" continues to be the dominating assumption of linguistic theory. The repetition of
this presupposition even in a call to give equal representation to both speech and writing
mistakes an observational statement for explanatory one. In effect, it holds to a nai've
empiricist view of writing inasmuch as it takes as common sense this relation of priority.
In other words, the observational statement takes for granted precisely what is in need of
explanation. Rather than asking what makes both speech and writing equally possible,
i.e., what makes both of them instances of the language faculty or a product of interacting
cognitive systems, the argument about priority gathers its force from the ideology of
common sense, since, what could be more plain than that speech comes first and writing
second?

It is just this common sense understanding of writing that the post-structural
philosopher Jacques Derrida disturbs in Of Grammatology when he raises the question of
the relationship between linguistic theory and a science of writing: "Has grammatology,
then, the right to expect from linguistics an essential assistance ... On the contrary, does
one not find efficaciously at work, in the very movement by which linguistics is instituted
as a science, a metaphysical presupposition about the relationship between speech and
writing?" (I 976, 28) DeITida addresses these questions with an eye to the deconstruction
of the metaphysical presupposition at work in linguistic theory. The outcome is not a
simple reversal of the ontological priority that places speech before writing, but a
generalization of the properties that define both linguistic media, or better yet, the
neutralization of these properties. As the phonological model suggests, the resolution of
the empirical differences between these two linguistic media forms not so much a genus as
an archphoneme. As the phonological models suggests, the empirical differences of an
opposition are not lost in the neutralization but retained as representations capable of
triggering the contrast between speech and writing without assigning any ontological
priority to the two instances of language. If one could say that deconstruction or poststructuralism has a cornerstone, the concept of neutralization would have to be one
cornerstone. Deconstruction makes much of the fact that the neutralization of a relevant
contrast does not destroy the opposition but goes into some kind of mental storage that is
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not exactly linear or locatable. Neutralization provides a model for deconstruction
precisely because the empirical contrast between segments is both retained and resolved
into this non-linear, non-place of representation in which the concept of priority is not
necessary. This non-place acts much as a blank sheet of paper upon which one would
write with white ink, as the French philosopher and cultural critic Luce Irigaray might put
it. The implications of this non-representational space for linguistic theo1y are myriad,
among these being the one Derrida asserts when he states: "Before being its object,
writing is the condition of the episteme." (Grammatology 27) What does it mean to say
that writing is the condition for Western scientific inquiry, linguistic or otherwise? I trace
out three strata of meaning for this assertion.
One stratum makes this statement kin with the entire Western idealist tradition in
philosophy. The transcendental critiques of Immanuel Kant provide a key point of
reference inasmuch as these attempt to specify not only the limits of human cognition but
also its new-found authority under the name of Enlightenment Reason. On the Kantian
reading, the condition of possibility for cognition in general is precisely the postulation of
a transcendental mental schemata that has to be in place in order for humans to do what
they do best: categorize the world in terms of such analytic and synthetic categories as
space, time, quantity, quality, relation, modality. The work of Paul Grice exemplifies the
abiding character of these categories for all the various branches of linguistic theory, from
phonology to discourse analysis and pragmatics. In The Origin of Geometry, Edmund
Husserl stretches the epistemological problems of Western idealist philosophy backwards
and forwards with results similar but not identical to Kant' s. Derrida's introductory
essay to Hussel' s The Origin ofGeometry spells out the relation of sameness and
difference between Kant and Husserl on this question of the origin of geometry and its
historiography. The first appearance of geometry along with every appearance thereafter
confirms the a priori status of the postulates of geometry but simultaneously raises
question about geometry's historicity. That is, where did geometry reside before being
observed and catalogued by the first mathematicians? Both Kant and Husserl falter on
this thoroughly historical question as both neutralize the question. Kant places
mathematical knowledge within the sphere of the transcedental schemata belonging
uniquely to human beings. This critical move is necessary if the question is to remain
4

with the realm of Enlightenment reason, which is to say within the subject already
possessing the scripts of the transcendental schemata. Geometry originates at the
moment that human beings transform empirical measurements of the earth into a
deductive system- a collection of axioms, theorems, and postulates stored in the archives
of human memory until empirical synthetic pressures bring to light their a priori analytic
status. The logic testifying to this appearance of geometry is not as much in dispute as
the fact that the condition for the appearance is not itself an empirical production but the
condition for all empirical production minus the transcendental schemata, which in
Kantian language are first analytic and only subsequently synthetic. The transcendental
schemata remain free of history because Kant resolves the question of the origin of
geometry into ideal mental representation located in human beings to be sure but
independent of them. The radical independence of the Kantian cognitive categories from
any specific individual means that geometry could have appeared to any subject
instructed in the transcendental schemata. Their autonomy thus signifies more of a
protohistory than an empirical history, which is to say that Kant's transcendental
schemata are a f01m of writing, highly abstract to be sure, but nonetheless sharing
important properties with its second cousin, the physical activity of coordinating eye,
blank surface, and some form of stylus to produce graphic marks. The schemata bear all
the traits of the complex coordination we nanowly call writing: spacing and linearity,
selection and combination, iteration and the potential absence of a subject, and of course,
erasure.
The phenomenology of Husserl also approaches the origin of geometry with an
indifference to history equal to Kant's. Husserl differs from Kant on many points but
not on the space wherein their neutralization of history opens up a space for geometry to
reside without falling from heaven. Perhaps it is fair to say that Husserl is more attentive
to the syntax accompanying the suspension of history to the extent that he insists
geometry owes its a priori status to iteration. Geometry establishes its unique or singular
appearance on the earth from the fact that its recursive mappings of form to function and
back prove themselves in the living present again and again not to be hallucinations. This
proof turns quickly enough into a living historical tradition whose present on-going
iterations guarantee the original appearance of geometry but also neutralize any historical
5

approach to it in favor of its reduction to the essential structure of human consciousness.
Husserl thus establishes the a priori status of geometry on a history that owes more to
the axiomatics of spacing, linearity, singularity, iteration, residing human consciousness
than to the search for empirical facts. From the standpoint of the Western idealist
tradition then, to say that writing is a condition of possibility for scientific inquiry is to
say that writing cannot be confined to the narrow activity of pressing stylus to blank
surface but is more like an open syntactic function-indifferent to specific values and
arguments for all its positions and operations-as Derrida puts it in Of Grammatology,
the blank space of thought.
Another stratum of meaning pushes this statement further back towards a still
more primordial site of origin. This reading trails the twin question of when and where
language as speech first appears, and as such raises the global question of the evolution of
language. In a sense, the global nature of the question of the evolution of language is
another version of the Kantian transcendental schemata, another perspective on the
question of what has to be in place for language to emerge on phylogenetic and
ontogenetic dimensions. It is also a reminder that linguistic change on whatever level of
grammatical description does not occur with any metaphysical interest or global teleology
to speak of. Here again, we postulate a blank space upon which the selectional pressures
of evolution work to make a species fit for its environment. Fitness in this scenario
would favor the development, design, and pe1manent storage of what formalists call the
language faculty and functionalist see as the product of interacting cognitive systems
turning conceptual structures into grammaticizations. From either a formal or
functionalist perspective, fitness for language implies the design features of
transmissability, learnability, and probably prevarication. Derek Bikerton's argument for
a bioprogram is one of the most salient uses of the metaphor of writing to explain the
emergence of the design features of language. In its most popular version, the argwnent
for a grammar.gene also goes under the name of a language instinct. But even if one is not
persuaded by the language instinct argument, the metaphor of writing continues to
constitute the data of formal and functional linguistic theory, a pressure from which
neither formalists nor functionalists are able to escape. Perhaps, there is no escape from
the pressure that writing broadly conceived puts on writers because no history or science
6

would be possible without writing in the narrow physical sense, the third stratum of
meaning one easily recognizes. And here too, human memory recalls the archive.
Roy HatTis is among the linguists today attempting to go beyond the common
sense opposition of writing and speech. The integrational linguistic theory Harris
advocates is exceptional not only because it does not seek to derive writing from speech
but also because it wears away at the attendant oppositions of mind and body, signified
and signifier. In Rethinking Writing (2000), Harris formulates the work of de-sedimenting
the opposition between speech and writing as a sort of prolegomena to any future work
in linguistic theory. His critique of the opposition stretches from the classical statements
of Plato and Aristotle to the founding names of linguistic theory in Europe and America.
Like Derrida, Harris takes apart the Platonic argument that writing is a poor imitation of
speech, poor in the same way that a portrait differs from its sitting subject, or worse yet,
as poor as the dead imitating the living. In all, his exposition of the treatment that writing
receives in the hands of Plato, Aristotle, Quintillian, Saussure, Hockett, and Bloomfield
attests to the abiding attraction of the common sense view of writing that writing
represents speech. I quote two passages for their encapsulation of the empirical and
epistemological problem this view of writing generates for contemporary linguistic
theory:
As soon as one begins to probe the traditional 'representation' story at all
insistently, both terminological and conceptual embarrassments are revealed. For
if language is what writing represents, then writing can hardly be at the same time
language. Unless we are being asked to accept that what writing represents is all
language, including itself. Yet we hear not only of 'written language' but of
'written languages'. How could there be any such thing(s) if writing is no more
that representation? If language is by nature audible and ephemeral, how could
anything which is neither phonetic nor transient be a fo1m or variety of language?
And how could it as Fevrier claims, 'fix' the ephemeral flux of the spoken word?
It is rather like maintaining in all seriousness that the meteorological chart fixes the
weather. .. (Rethinking Writing 2000 186).

It is clear that if the traditional ' representational' account is to pass muster at all,
it must be given a much more careful fo1mulation that the muddled one which
historians of writing are still evidently happy to perpetuate. Can this be done in
such a way as to rescue the story from its own incoherences? (187)
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My wanderings leave me with no direct response to this question. Moreover,
considerations of time leave me owing you the audience a fuller account of how writing
constitutes data rather than simply records it-a pressure at work within both formal or a
functional linguistic theory. Such an account would show in a sustained way how the
incoherences work their way into the scene of writing of both formal and functional
linguists as they arrange, describe, and seek to explain the data. In lieu, let me offer an
example of what I mean when I say that writing, now conceived as an induction from
particulars to an abstract conception, constitutes the data of linguistics. I take the
example from a text I used this semester to teach English syntax to seniors and graduate
students at the University of New Mexico.
In Understanding English Grammar: A Linguistic Approach (1995, 2003), Ronald
Wardhaugh provides the following typical ditransitive pattern:
(A).

1. The woman gave a dollar to the man~ gave (the man) a dollar
2. He left the money to her ~ left (her) the money
3. She made a sweater for him ~ made (him) a sweater
4. He poured a drink for her ~ poured (her) a drink
5. The girl told a story to me ~ told (me) (a story)
6. They asked a lot of questions *to/for her ~ they asked (her) (a lot of questions)

In typical notational convention, the parenthesis signify optional deletion of the object
phrase. In his description of this common syntactic, Wardhaugh contrasts the verbs that
allow deletion of indirect but not direct object. The restriction on the deletion works
straight forwardly with all the verbs that take to orfor as case-assigners, which extends to
the speech act verb tell but not ask. As a token, ask disturbs the paradigm both by not
answering to the restriction on indirect object deletion as well by requiring a case-assigner
that jumps the prototypical dative pattern semantically and structurally. Thus, on the
one hand ask patterns like its speech act counterpart tell insofar as both allow deletion of
both objects separately. It fails to pattern with structurally with tell however inasmuch
as the constituent playing the thematic role of indirect object must be marked by
something like a possessive case-assigner. In other words, even with respect to its nearest
relative in speech act terms it does not behave like the dative pattern as it is
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prototypically defined by the verb give, which must involve in its event structure the
transfer of some object or favor to a human being who benefits from the transfer in some
way. Further complications arise in the determination of ask as a di transitive with
semantic relatives in the family of dative when the constituent being named as indirect
object can alternate with a clausal constituent that once patterns tell.
(B).

1. I told him [that we were going]
2. I asked him [who was coming]

In descriptive dispute here is not the ditransitive properties of ask but whether its two
complements are parallel in form and function with tell. Substitution tests show up the
near but not complete nonparallel syntactic strucuture:
(C).

1. I told him [who was going] ~ I asked him [who was coming]
2. I told him [that we were going] f:- *I asked [that we were coming]
3. I told him [that we were going] ~ I asked him [whether we were going]

The disturbance the pattern exhibits here moves ask further away from the protoypical
dative class. The distance grows when advise joins the speech act set of tell and ask.
(E).

1. I advised them [where to go]/I advised them [to go]

To say that the distance grows between the protoypical dative category and the precise
subcategorization of ask is to ask if ditransitivity is enough to categorize it with the
semantics of the dative. If, as I am suggesting, it is not, then ask is being constituted as a
dative category whether it wants to not.
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The Constitution of Data in Linguistic Theory: Writing
My wanderings leave me with with no direct response to this question. Moreover,
considerations of time leave me owing you the audience a fuller account of how writing
constitutes data rather than simply records it- a pressure at work within both formal and
functional linguistic theory. Such an account would show in a sustained way how the
incoherences work their way into the scene of writing of both fo1mal and functional
linguistics. In lieu, let me offer an example of what I mean when I say that writing, now
conceived as an induction from particulars to an abstract conception, constitutes the data
of linguistics. I take the example from a text I used this semester to teach English syntax
to seniors and graduate students at the University of New Mexico.In Understanding
English Grammar: A Linguistic Approach (1995, 2003), Ronald Wardhaugh provides the
following array of data focused on ditransitivity:
(A).

I. The woman gave a dollar to the man ~ gave (the man) a dollar
2. He left the money to her ~ left (her) the money
3. She made a sweater for him ~ made (him) a sweater
4. He poured a drink for her ~ poured (her) a drink
5. The girl told a story to me ~ told (me) (a story)
6. They asked a lot of questions *to/for her~ they asked (her) (a lot of questions)

(B).

I. I told him [that we were going]
2. I asked him [ who was coming]

(C).

I. I told him (who was going]::::: I asked him [who was coming]
2. I told him [that we were going] ::f. *I asked (that we were coming]
3. I told him [that we were going] ::::: I asked him [whether we were going]

(E).

I. I advised them [where to go ]/1advised them [to go]

To say that the distance grows between the protoypical dative category and the precise
subcategorization of ask is to ask if ditransitivity is enough to categorize it with the
semantics of the dative. If, as I am suggesting, it is not, then ask is being constituted as a
dative category whether it wants to not.
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